An evolutionary game of environmental regulation among local governments in China was established in this paper, and we analyzed the dynamic evolution rules of the environmental regulation strategy among local governments as well as the impact of environmental regulation on regional ecological efficiency in China by using the spatial panel simultaneous equations based on the panel data of various regions in China from 2007 to 2014. The research results show that the local government will adjust their own strategies during the environmental regulation strategy game constantly, and the external effect does not affect the choice of government's environment regulation strategy, and the government will choose their environmental regulation strategy by measuring the gain and cost of the environmental regulation under the condition with no constraint mechanism, and the government will not be intent to perform the environmental regulation, and it will lead to the phenomena of "prisoner's dilemma". And the empirical research result shows that there exists the behavior of mutual imitation during the process of establishment and implement of environmental regulation and the environmental regulation has obvious restrictive function on the local ecological efficiency in China.
Introduction
In recent years, with the rapid growth of economy in China, the ecological environment also suffered serious damage, and the problem of environmental pollution has affected the daily life of the people and the sustainable development of regional economy. Although the government in China has issued a series of the law and environmental policy to improve the environmental conditions and restrict violators, the remediation effect of environmental problem is not obvious at the current. Therefore, it is significance to make a research about how to establish the environmental regulation strategies effectively to improve the problem of regional ecological environment for all levels of local governments.
At present, the domestic and foreign scholars have made some researches on the agents' strategic behavior of environmental regulation, the ecological efficiency, as well as the impact of the agents' strategic behavior of environmental regulation on the ecological efficiency. The research about the agents' strategic behavior of environmental regulation mainly focused on two aspects: (i) the first is about the evolutionary game behavior between the environmental regulation subject and the environmental regulation object (Baek and Koo, 2009; Elliott and Zhou, 2013; Manderson and Kneller, 2012; Moledina et al., 2003; Zhang and Qu, 
